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Plaintiff-Appellant GLFP, Ltd. ("GLFP"), pursuant to U.R.A.P. 35, petitions 
for rehearing of the Panel Opinion filed on April 19, 2007. A copy of the Opinion 
is attached hereto as Exhibit A. This petition for rehearing is limited to the Panel's 
derivative claims holding (Op. at 3-5), and its rejection of the close-corporation 
exception (Op. at 7-12). Counsel for GLFP hereby certifies that this petition is 
presented in good faith and not for delay. 
ARGUMENT 
L THE PANEL'S HOLDING THAT GLFP'S CLAIMS ARE 
DERIVATIVE MISAPPREHENDS THE RECORD. 
The Panel has fundamentally misapprehended the record regarding GLFP's 
claim based on reduced or non-existent distributions. In particular, the Court 
describes GLFP's argument as based on a claim "that GLFP suffered a harm 
distinct from any harm CL Properties suffered when it received reduced 
distributions from CL Properties. In essence, GLFP argues that Defendants' 
conduct financially injured CL Properties in such a way that CL Properties cannot 
make adequate distributions to GLFP. In other words, GLFP was injured because 
CL Properties was injured." Op. ^ 10 (emphasis added), Ex. A. 
This is not at all what GLFP claimed or alleged. Indeed, GLFP never based 
a claim on reduced distributions from CL Properties. Instead, GLFP's claim was 
that it received reduced distributions from CL Mgmt because the Clarks were using 
CL Mgmt funds - collected from CL Properties - to benefit other Clark holdings. 
1 
R. at 4-5 (Complaint at f^l| 12-14). Perhaps the source of the confusion is GLFP's 
status as a limited partner of both CL Mgmt and CL Properties. R. at 2 (Complaint 
at ]^ 4). But the distinction is critical. GLFP did not claim that it was injured as a 
result of injuries to CL Properties, and GLFP did not seek damages for injuries to 
any entity other than itself. See, e.g., Br. of Appellant at 9 and Ex. 2, a copy of Ex. 
2 is attached hereto as Exhibit B. Exhibit 2 graphically depicts that the reduced or 
non-existent distributions were from CL Mgmt, not CL Properties. See also R. at 
258 (Plaintiffs Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment), stating 
as follows: 
The direct harm to GLFP is that, contrary to the Clarks' 
prior representations, the excessive fees do not equally 
benefit the Clarks and GLFP via distributions from 
CL Mgmt. In other words, the fees come in the front-end 
from CL Properties, but do not come out the back-end to 
plaintiff. 
See also R. at 4-5 (Complaint); 272-273 (Expert Report); Br. of Appellant at 7 
("Thus, the direct harm to GLFP was that . . . the excessive fees did not equally 
benefit the Clarks and GLFP via distributions from CL Mgmt; adequate 
distributions did not take place because of the commingling and use of the fees to 
benefit the Clarks' separate business entities.") (emphasis added). 
The Court's analysis, because of its misapprehension of the record, misses 
the point. GLFP's injury is not, as stated by the Court, "necessarily linked to the 
financial health of CL Properties . . . ." Op. ^ 10. In fact, the financial health of 
2 
CL Properties has very little to do with this claim. Instead, it is the actions of the 
Clarks and CL Mgmt in denying GLFP distributions from CL Mgmt - because the 
Clarks are using CL Mgmt funds to benefit other Clark entities - that is the basis 
of GLFP's claim and special harm. As noted in GLFP's brief, this harm is unique 
to GLFP because the other primary limited partner in CL Mgmt - HCLP (the 
"Howard Clark Family Partnership") - is controlled by the Clarks and thus 
indirectly benefits from the commingling and diversion of funds. Br. at 10. Thus, 
GLFP is uniquely harmed by the commingling. The Clarks certainly are not, and 
neither is CL Properties. Therefore, the claim is not derivative. 
Because the Court has fundamentally misapprehended the record with 
respect to this issue, rehearing is warranted. 
II. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS OF THE CLOSE-CORPORATION 
EXCEPTION IS LEGALLY ERRONEOUS 
The Court's Opinion rescues the trial court by finding it properly exercised 
its discretion - in refusing to allow GLFP to invoke the closely-held limited 
partnership exception - even though the record is devoid of any reasoning by the 
trial court on this issue. The Opinion supplies a rationale as follows: 
The trial court was within its discretion in concluding 
that to allow GLFP to proceed individually could subject 
Defendants to inconsistent liability to these excluded 
parties [MB Management Inc., the GAL Marital 
Deduction Trust, and the Howard Clark Family 
Partnership], and could "spawn multiple litigation among 
3 
the partnership, the individual partners, and 
[Defendants." 
Op. at U 23, quoting Kemp v. Murray, 680 P.2d 758, 761 (Utah 1984). But the trial 
court made no such finding, perhaps because Defendants never argued this point 
below. Defendants first raised the issue in their Answer Brief before this Court. 
Br. of Appellee at 29. Thus, the Opinion provides a rationale for the trial court's 
exercise of its discretion that was not articulated by the district court, nor argued by 
Defendants below. There is nothing in the record, other than rank speculation, to 
suggest that any of the entities not named as parties in this case also might assert 
claims and thereby subject Defendants to inconsistent liability. Indeed, there is 
ample reason to believe otherwise since the Clarks completely control HCFP and 
are unlikely to sue themselves, and the GL Marital Trust is controlled by Merline 
Learning, and thus could have joined this lawsuit if the Trust were inclined to 
assert a claim. Indeed, the fact that the same individuals are involved in all these 
entities supports application of the closely-held exception. 
The Panel is no doubt correct that the trial court can and should exercise its 
discretion on this issue. However, that discretion should be both informed and 
articulated, not provided after-the-fact. In providing an erroneous rationale for the 
court below, this Court is engaged in speculation and has violated the standards 
applicable to a review of summary judgment. If the Panel does not reconsider its 
4 
holding that GLFP's claims are all derivative, it should remand to the trial court for 
adequate consideration of the closely-held exception. 
Dated this 14th day of May 2007. 
HOLLAND & HART LLP 
Brent E.(Johnson, 7558 
Katherine Norman, 9573 
Cecilia M. Romero 9570 
Holland & Hart LLP 
A. Bruce Jones, CO #11370 
Holland & Hart LLP 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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v. 
CL Management, Ltd., a Utah 
limited partnership; Clark 
Learning Properties, a Utah 
limited partnership; and 
Howard S. Clark and H. Scott 
Clark, individuals, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
OPINION 
(For Official Publication) 
Case No. 20060440-CA 
F I L E D 
( A p r i l 1 9 , 2007) 
1 ? °^1 UT App 131 
Third District, Salt Lake Department, 050902498 
The Honorable Glenn K. Iwasaki 
Attorneys: Brent E. Johnson and Katherine Norman, Salt Lake 
City, and A. Bruce Jones, Denver, Colorado, for 
Appellant 
Jeffery S. Williams, Salt Lake City, for Appellees 
Before Judges Billings, Davis, and McHugh. 
McHUGH, Judge: 
Hi GLFP Ltd., a limited partnership, appeals the trial court's 
order granting summary judgment in favor of CL Management, Ltd., 
Clark Learning Properties, Howard S. Clark, and H. Scott Clark. 
GLFP also appeals the trial court's refusal to allow GLFP to 
amend its complaint. We affirm in part and reverse in part. 
BACKGROUND 
1(2 Merline Learning and Howard Clark are brother and sister. 
Learning is the majority owner of GLFP (the Gerald Learning Family 
Partnership).1 Clark is the majority owner of the Howard Clark 
Family Partnership. Together, GLFP and the Howard Clark Family 
Partnership are also limited partners in another business entity 
called Clairk Learning Properties (CL Properties) . As limited 
partners, GLFP and the Howard Clark Family Partnership each own 
45% of CL Properties. The remaining 10% of CL Properties is 
owned by its general manager, CL Management. CL Management is 
controlled by Clark and another corporate entity called MB 
Management Inc.2 CL Management's primary business purpose is to 
manage real estate holdings, including CL Properties's real 
estate holdings in Arizona and California. 
H3 Starting in 1992, family relations between the Learnings and 
the Clarks began to erode due to disputes with respect to their 
joint business interests. In particular, the Learnings became 
unhappy with the management services that CL Management provided 
to CL Properties. In February 2005, GLFP filed a complaint 
against Clark and his son H. Scott Clark, CL Management, and CL 
Properties (collectively, Defendants) alleging that 
(1) Defendants caused CL Management to charge CL Properties 
excessive management fees, (2) Defendants caused CL Management to 
use those fees to manage properties not owned by CL Properties, 
(3) Defendants caused CL Management to mismanage CL Properties's 
real estate holdings, and (4) Defendants CL Management and the 
Clarks breached a fiduciary duty to GLFP. GLFP also sought 
judicial dissolution of CL Properties and CL Management and an 
accounting. 
t4 Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment claiming that 
GLFP had improperly asserted derivative claims directly, without 
having first made demand on CL Properties, contrary to rule 23.1 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The trial court granted 
Defendants' request, finding that all of GLFP's claims---including 
its request for judicial dissolution and an accounting--were 
based on derivative theories of recovery and, therefore, could 
not be brought directly without GLFP first making demand on CL 
Properties. The trial court rejected GLFP's argument that it was 
exempt from the demand requirement. The trial court also denied 
GLFP's request to amend its complaint to restate the causes of 
action as derivative claims, finding the motion to amend "moot." 
GLFP now appeals. 
1. GLFP was a limited partnership at the time it filed its 
complaint in this case. Since that time, GLFP converted to a 
limited liability company. We continue to refer to GFLP as a 
limited partnership. 
2. MB Management Inc. is partially owned by Howard Clark's wife 
and is not a party to this litigation. 
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ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1(5 GLFP argues that the trial court erred by granting 
Defendant's motion for summary judgment. We affirm summary 
judgment only when "there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). "We grant the trial 
court's legal conclusions no deference, reviewing them for 
correctness. Furthermore, in reviewing a grant of summary 
judgment, we view the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn 
therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." 
Arnold Indus., Inc. v. Love, 2002 UT 133,111, 63 P.3d 721 
(citation and quotations omitted). GLFP also argues that the 
trial court erred in refusing to allow it to amend its complaint. 
We review a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to 
amend a complaint for abuse of discretion. See R & R Energies v. 
Mother Earth Indus., Inc., 936 P.2d 1068, 1080 (Utah 1997). 
ANALYSIS 
%6 GLFP asserts that the trial court erred when it (1) 
determined that all of GLFP's claims were derivative claims 
belonging to CL Properties; (2) refused to invoke an exception 
allowing limited partners to pursue derivative claims directly; 
and (3) refused to allow GLFP to amend its complaint. We affirm 
the trial court's determination that GLFP's claims concerning 
fees, mismanagement, and fiduciary breach are each derivative and 
therefore belong to CL Properties, but find that the trial court 
erred in refusing to allow GLFP to seek judicial dissolution and 
dissolution-related accounting in accordance with Utah Code 
sections 48-2a-802 and 49-1-40. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 48-2a-802 
(2002), 49-1-40 (2002). We also affirm the trial court's refusal 
to find that, under the close corporation exception, GLFP is 
exempt from making demand prior to bringing a derivative claim. 
Finally, we remand to the trial court for reconsideration of 
GLFP's motion to amend its complaint. 
I. Derivative Claims 
f7 GLFP claims that as a result of misconduct on the part of 
Defendants, GLFP received less than its fair share of 
distributions from CL Properties. GLFP asserts that it suffered 
direct and distinct harm--separate from any harm suffered by CL 
Properties--and that its complaint therefore properly alleges a 
direct action. We disagree. 
t8 This court looks to principles of corporate law to 
distinguish derivative actions from individual actions in the 
context of limited partnerships. See Arndt v. First Interstate 
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Bank of Utah, 1999 UT 91,1(24, 991 P.2d 584 (concluding that "it 
is appropriate to apply corporate principles concerning 
derivative actions to limited partnerships"). Utah law defines 
derivative suits as 
those which seek to enforce any right which 
belongs to the corporation. Actions alleging 
mismanagement, breach of fiduciary duties, 
and appropriation or waste of corporate 
opportunities and assets generally belong to 
the corporation, and therefore, a shareholder 
must bring such actions on its behalf. 
Moreover, even though wrongdoing or fraud of 
corporate officers may indirectly injure 
shareholders, shareholders generally cannot 
sue directly for those injuries. 
Aurora Credit Servs., Inc. v. Liberty W. Dev., Inc., 970 P.2d 
1273, 1280 (Utah 1998) (emphasis added) (citations and quotations 
omitted); see also Warner v. DMG Color, Inc., 2000 UT 102,1(12, 20 
P.3d 8 68 ("Claims of mismanagement, breach of fiduciary duties, 
and appropriation or waste of corporate opportunities are claims 
that the corporation has been injured. Accordingly, the cause of 
action belongs to the corporation and shareholders may sue only 
on its behalf.11). In contrast, a direct claim is one where " ! the 
injury is one to the plaintiff as a stockholder . . . , and not 
to the corporation, as where the action is based on contract to 
which he is a party, or on a right belonging severally to him, or 
on a fraud affecting him directly.'" See Aurora Credit, 970 P.2d 
at 1280 (quoting Richardson v. Arizona Fuels Corp., 614 P.2d 636, 
639 (Utah 1980)). 
1(9 Here, GLFP's claims of fiduciary breach, excessive fees, 
commingling of fees, and mismanagement of property each fall 
squarely in the category of claims that Utah law recognizes as 
classically derivative. See, e.g., Richardson, 614 P.2d at 63 9 
(noting that fiduciary breach claims are derivative because, 
while "directors and officers [of a corporation] stand in a like 
relation to the stockholders of the corporation, . . . that 
relation is to the stockholders collectively" and therefore the 
claim for relief belongs to the corporation (citation omitted)); 
see also id. at 640 ("The rule in Utah is that mismanagement of 
the corporation gives rise to a cause of action in the 
corporation, even if the mismanagement results in damage to 
stockholders by depreciating the value of the corporation's 
stock."). 
1(10 GLFP's sole argument in support of asserting its claims 
directly instead of derivatively is that GLFP suffered a. harm 
distinct from any harm CL Properties suffered when it received 
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reduced distributions from CL Properties. In essence, GLFP 
argues that Defendants' conduct financially injured CL Properties 
in such a way that CL Properties cannot make adequate 
distributions to GLFP. In other words, GLFP was injured because 
CL Properties was injured. Because GLFP's injury is necessarily 
linked to the financial health of CL Properties, however, GLFP's 
claim lacks "the distinctive qualities necessary to remove [it] 
from the category of derivative claims." Arndt, 1999 UT 91 at 
1(22 (holding that losses suffered by plaintiffs attempting to 
bring a class action suit were derivative because they were based 
on the decreased value of the partnership, and therefore 
plaintiffs suffered an "indirect and contingent" loss)/ see also 
Golden Tee, Inc. v. Venture Golf Sch., Inc., 969 S.W.2d 625, 630 
(Ark. 1998) (holding that claims were derivative because the 
"primary injury" alleged by the stockholders was, in fact, only 
for "indirect damages by way of injury to the partnership"); 
Litman v. Prudential-Bache Props., Inc., 611 A.2d 12, 16 (Del. 
Ch. 1992) (holding that allegations that a general partner's 
misconduct directly injured a limited partner's distribution 
rights is a derivative claim because it is the equivalent of 
alleging that a general partner injured the partnership); 
Northern Trust Co. v. VIII S. Mich. Assocs., 657 N.E.2d 1095, 
1101 (111. Ct. App. 1995) ("Limited partners do not have a cause 
of action for damages to their interest in a limited 
partnership."). 
fll Accordingly, the trial court correctly identified GLFP's 
claims for breach of fiduciary duty, excessive fees, commingling 
of fees, and mismanagement as derivative claims belonging to the 
corporation or limited partnership. 
II. Dissolution and Accounting Claims 
Hl2 GLFP next argues that the trial court erred in granting 
Defendants summary judgment on GLFP's judicial dissolution and 
accounting claims. The trial court held that these claims were 
so squarely rooted in derivative theories of recovery that "they 
lack[ed] any basis." We disagree. Utah's Revised Uniform 
Limited Partnership Act (the Act), see Utah Code Ann. §§ 48-2a-
101 to -1107 (2002 & Supp. 2006), provides that limited partners 
may seek judicial dissolution "whenever it is not reasonably 
practicable to carry on the business in conformity with the 
partnership agreement or for failure to comply with the 
requirements of [the Act,]" see id. § 48-2a-802. That section 
states: 
On application by or for a partner or the 
director of the division, a district court 
having competent jurisdiction may decree 
dissolution of the limited partnership 
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whenever it is not reasonably practicable to 
carry on the business in conformity with the 
partnership agreement or for failure to 
comply with the requirements of this chapter. 
Id. 
Kl3 In its complaint, GLFP sought judicial dissolution and an 
accounting based on claims separate from the derivative claims 
addressed above. GLFP specifically alleged that Defendants 
failed to allow GLFP access to partnership records or information 
in violation of section 3 05 of the Act, and that Defendants 
failed to share profits, losses, and distributions of the limited 
partnership with GLFP in violation of sections 503 and 504 of the 
Act. See id. §§ 48-2a-503 to -504 (2002). These allegations set 
forth a sufficient basis--separate and distinct from GLFP's 
derivative claims--for seeking judicial dissolution. The trial 
court therefore erred in refusing to allow GLFP to pursue these 
claims. 
f14 GLFP also claims that " [a]s part of the dissolution of the 
Defendant partnerships, Plaintiff is entitled to an accounting." 
Defendants argue, and the trial court agreed, that the claim for 
an accounting is also derivative and belongs to the partnership. 
In support of their position, Defendants cite Richardson v. 
Arizona Fuels Corp., 614 P.2d 636 (Utah 1980), for the 
proposition that a claim for an accounting is always derivative. 
We believe Defendants have misapprehended the scope of the 
Richardson decision. In Richardson, the Utah Supreme Court held 
that the plaintiffs had improperly alleged claims that belonged 
to the corporation, including breach of fiduciary duty and 
mismanagement. See id. at 639-40. The Richardson court also 
found that, as pled in the complaint, the accounting claim was 
derivative, stating: 
The eleventh cause of action alleges the 
possibility of other conversions of [the 
corporation's assets] and alleges that the 
defendants should be required to account to 
the stockholders for all of the assets of 
[the corporation] and disgorge themselves of 
any assets so converted. This claim also 
clearly belongs to the corporation. 
Id. at 64 0. The claim for an accounting in Richardson was 
asserted as part of a cause of action seeking damages for 
conversion. See id. Consequently, that request for an 
accounting was inextricably intertwined with the damages claim 
and properly belonged to the corporation. 
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fl5 Here, GLFP seeks an accounting "as part of the dissolution" 
and not in connection with a claim for damages under a 
classically derivative theory. Indeed, the Utah Legislature has 
created a statutory right to an accounting for any partner at the 
date of dissolution. See Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-40 (2002) ("The 
right to an account of his interest shall accrue to any partner 
. . . at the date of dissolution in the absence of any agreement 
to the contrary."). Thus, although we agree with the trial court 
that a claim for an accounting that is part and parcel of a 
derivative claim is likewise derivative, we hold that GLFP is 
entitled to pursue a direct claim for an accounting in connection 
with its cause of action for dissolution. If GLFP proves its 
entitlement to dissolution, Utah Code section 48-1-40 gives it a 
corresponding right for an accounting at the time of dissolution 
absent an agreement to the contrary. See id. 
III. The Close Corporation Exception 
fl6 GLFP next argues that, even if some of its claims are 
derivative, the trial court should have invoked an exception 
allowing limited partners to pursue derivative claims directly. 
1[l7 Under principles of corporate law, "the right to seek the 
redress of corporate grievances belongs to the corporation to be 
exercised by corporate management." Dansie v. City of Herriman, 
2006 UT 23,1126, 134 P. 3d 1139. Rule 23.1 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure provides an exception to this general rule by 
allowing members or shareholders to bring a derivative action if 
certain conditions are met. See Utah R. Civ. P. 23.1; Dansie, 
2006 UT 23 at ^26. To protect the right of the corporation to 
govern its own affairs, plaintiffs bringing a derivative claim 
must first make demand on the corporation "to have an action 
brought and prosecuted in the name of the corporation to redress 
the grievances complained of [. ] " Dansie, 2006 UT 23 at <|21 
(quotations omitted). Individual shareholders may bring claims 
directly against the corporation without first making demand only 
in very limited circumstances, and only when complying with 
strict pleading requirements. See Utah R. Civ. P. 23.1 ("The 
complaint shall also allege with particularity the efforts, if 
any, made by the plaintiff to obtain the action he desires from 
the directors or comparable authority and, if necessary, from the 
shareholders or members, and the reasons for his failure to 
obtain the action or for not making the effort."); see also 
Dansie, 2006 UT 23 at [^27 ("In fact, it will generally require 
less effort for the plaintiff to make a demand on the corporation 
than to satisfy rule 23.1's stringent pleading requirements."). 
Hl8 Utah's Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act similarly 
provides that limited partners may bring derivative claims 
directly only if: 
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[G]eneral partners with authority to do so 
have refused to bring the action and the 
general partners1 decision not to sue 
constitutes an abuse of discretion or 
involves a conflict of interest that prevents 
an unprejudiced exercise of judgment, or if 
an effort to cause those general partners to 
bring the action is not likely to succeed. 
Utah Code Ann. §48-2a-1001 (2002). Like rule 23.1, the Act 
further requires that a limited partner's complaint must "set 
forth with particularity the effort of the plaintiff to secure 
initiation of the action by a general partner or the reasons for 
not making the effort." Compare Utah R. Civ. P. 23.1, with Utah 
Code Ann. § 48-2a-1003 (2002) . 
Ul9 Before bringing direct claims against Defendants, GLFP did 
not make demand upon CL Properties, nor did its pleadings allege 
"with particularity the effort of the plaintiff to secure 
initiation of the action by a general partner or the reasons for 
not making the effort." Utah Code Ann. § 48-2a-1003. Instead, 
GLFP seeks to file its claims pursuant to an exception whereby 
shareholders in a closely held corporation may be permitted to 
bring derivative claims directly. 
1J2 0 In Aurora Credit Services, Inc. v. Liberty West Development 
Inc., 970 P.2d 1273 (Utah 1980), the Utah Supreme Court 
recognized a "growing trend" where a court may exempt a 
shareholder in a closely held corporation from having to comply 
with the strict requirements of derivative actions and instead 
bring a claim directly if it finds that to do so will not: 
(i) unfairly expose the corporation or 
defendants to a multiplicity of actions, (ii) 
materially prejudice the interests of 
creditors of the corporation, or (iii) 
interfere with a fair distribution of the 
recovery among all interested persons. 
Id. at 1280. And later, in Arndt v. First Interstate Bank of 
Utah, 1999 UT 91, 991 P.2d 584, the Utah Supreme Court revisited 
the AuroraL Credit analysis in the context of limited 
partnerships. See id. at 1(22. In applying the Aurora Credit 
analysis, however, the Arndt court merged the concepts of the 
close corporation exception with the direct injury requirement, 
finding that the Aurora Credit analysis did not remove the claims 
from the category of derivative claims because the plaintiffs' 
injuries stemmed only from their non-particularized interests in 
the subject partnerships. See id. Thus, in Utah, the scope of 
the close corporation exception is unclear, as is whether a 
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partner may bring classically derivative claims under the 
exception absent a particularized injury.3 See Dansie, 2006 UT 
23 at K16 ("We have not had the opportunity to fully delineate 
the bounds of the [Aurora Credit] exception in Utah.")/ cf. Utah 
Code Ann. § 48-2a-1001 (failing to exempt limited partners from 
the requirement that the general partners must have refused to 
pursue the action before the limited partner may proceed 
directly). Indeed, since its decision in Aurora Credit, the Utah 
Supreme Court has not sanctioned this exception, and has recently 
suggested that the trend to invoke it may have "stopp[ed] in its 
tracks" or "retreated," and that it has been "severely limited or 
rejected" in some jurisdictions.4 Dansie, 2006 UT 23 at fl6; see 
3. In Arndt v. First Interstate Bank of Utah, 1999 UT 91, 991 
P.2d 584, the Utah Supreme Court noted that "[t]he injury alleged 
in Aurora Credit [Services, Inc. v. Liberty West Development 
Inc., 970 P.2d 1273 (Utah 1998),] was suffered uniquely by Aurora 
Credit and therefore was much more direct than is a typical 
derivative claim." Arndt, 1999 UT 91 at i|21. Although Aurora 
Credit indicates that the subject corporation was formed by four 
individuals, only two shareholders appear to own stock in the 
company. See Aurora Credit, 97 0 P.2d at 12 75; see also Peter H. 
Donaldson, Breathing Life Into Aurora Credit Services, Inc. v. 
Liberty West Development Inc.: Utah's Close Corporation 
Exception to the Derivative Lawsuit Requirement and Case for 
Strong Fiduciary Duties in Close Corporations, 20 02 Utah L. Rev. 
519, 53 8 ("Aurora Credit involved a dispute between two lone 
shareholders . . . .") (Donaldson, Breathing Life Into Aurora 
Credit). Thus, Aurora Credit's injury was unique because there 
were no other shareholders that could have been injured by the 
wrongful acts of the controlling shareholder. The Arndt Court 
seems to have limited the close corporation exception to facts 
like Aurora Credit where the unusually small allocation of 
ownership in the company results in a specialized injury to the 
plaintiff. 
4. Mississippi, Nebraska, South Dakota, Alaska, and Arkansas 
each refuse to apply the close corporation exception, recognizing 
instead that an individual shareholder can bring a direct action 
only when a stockholder "shows a violation of duty owed directly 
to him" or when an injury is "peculiar" to him. See, e.g., 
Crocker v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 826 F.2d 347, 349 & n.3 
(5th Cir. 1987) (applying Mississippi law and noting that a 
stockholder may sue directly "'in a case where the stockholder 
shows a violation of duty owed directly to him'" (quoting Bruno 
v. Southeastern Servs., 385 So. 2d 620, 622 (Miss. 1980))); 
Landstrom v. Shaver, 561 N.W.2d 1 (S.D. 1997)("[F]or a 
shareholder to maintain an individual action, the shareholder 
(continued...) 
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also Warner v. DMG Color, Inc., 2000 UT 102,1(19, 20 P.3d 868 
(refusing to apply the Aurora Credit close corporation exception 
where derivative claims belong to the bankruptcy estate); Arndt, 
1999 UT 91 at f22 (purporting to apply the Aurora Credit close 
corporation exception to limited partnerships but also requiring 
a unique injury to plaintiff separate from losses contingent to 
those of the partnership). 
^21 Assuming without deciding that the close corporation 
exception is still viable in Utah, and assuming without deciding 
that the exception does, in fact, apply in the context of 
limited partnerships, we conclude that the trial court did not 
abuse its broad discretion in refusing to invoke it here. 
1(22 The close corporation exception to the distinction between 
direct and derivative actions was adopted as a compromise 
position by the American Law Institute (ALI) in 1992. See 
American Law Institute, Principles of Corporate Governance: 
Analysis and Recommendations § 7.01 (1994) (ALI, Principles of 
Corporate Governance); see also Peter H. Donaldson, Breathing 
Life Into Aurora Credit Services, Inc. v. Liberty West 
Development, Inc: Utah's Close Corporation Exception to the 
Derivative Lawsuit Requirement and Case for Strong Fiduciary 
Duties in Close Corporations, 2002 Utah L. Rev. 519, 527-28 
(Donaldson, Breathing Life Into Aurora Credit). Section 7.01 of 
the ALI Principles of Corporate Governance recommends a rule 
whereby the trial court, in its discretion, may allow a 
shareholder in a closely held corporation to proceed directly 
with classically derivative claims if the court finds that to do 
so will not "(i) unfairly expose the corporation or the 
defendants to a multiplicity of actions, (ii) materially 
prejudice the interests of creditors of the corporation, or (iii) 
interfere with a fair distribution of the recovery among all 
interested persons." ALI, Principles of Corporate Governance 
§ 7.01(d). The ALI position, which was adopted by the Utah 
Supreme Court in Aurora Credit, see 970 P.2d at 1280, leaves 
4 . (...continued) 
must establish a 'special injury1 which is separate and distinct 
from that of other shareholders."); Meyerson v. Coopers & 
Lybrand, 448 N.W.2d 129, 134 (Neb. 1989) (requiring shareholders 
to allege a "separate and distinct injury" if bringing an 
individual action); Donaldson, Breathing Life Into Aurora 
Services, 2002 Utah L. Rev at 531 (discussing states that have 
adopted special injury requirement); cf., e.g., Hikita v. Nichiro 
Gvocryo Kaisha, Ltd., 713 P.2d 1197, 1200 (Alaska 1986) (finding 
that shareholders may assert direct claims for breach of contract 
to which he is a party); Hames v. Cravens, 966 S.W.2d 244, 247 
(Ark. 1998) (same). 
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ultimate discretion in applying the exception with the trial 
court. See ALI, Principles of Corporate Governance § 7.01(d) 
cmt. e. Thus, even if the three prongs of the test are met, the 
trial court may deny the shareholder the right to proceed 
directly. See Aurora Credit, 970 P.2d at 1280 ("We therefore 
hold that a court may allow a minority shareholder in a closely 
held corporation to proceed directly against corporate officers." 
(emphasis added)); see also Mynatt v. Collis, 57 P.3d 513, 530 
(Kan. 2002) ("Even if all three prongs of the test were met, the 
district court, in its equitable power and discretion, could deny 
[shareholders] the ability to proceed directly.");5 ALI, 
Principles of Corporate Governance, 7.01(d) cmt. e (acknowledging 
that trial court has discretion in determining if minority 
shareholder should be allowed to proceed directly); 12B Fletcher 
Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations § 5911.50 (Perm. 
Ed. 2000) (same); Donaldson, Breathing Life Into Aurora Credit, 
2002 Utah L. Rev. at 527-28 (same). 
[^23 Here, the trial court found that "the evidence in the record 
simply does not support such an exception" or otherwise show that 
the three criterion adopted in Aurora Credit, see 970 P.2d at 
128 0, listed above, are satisfied. Parties that could 
potentially be affected by GLFP's direct suit against Defendants 
are not before the court. MB Management Inc., is a general 
partner and owner of CL Management, but is not a party to this 
litigation. The GAL Marital Deduction Trust, a limited partner 
of CL Management, and the Howard Clark Family Partnership, a 
limited partner of CL Properties, are also absent from this 
litigation. The trial court was within its discretion in 
concluding that to allow GLFP to proceed individually could 
subject Defendants to inconsistent liability to these excluded 
parties, and could "spawn multiple litigation among the 
partnership, the individual partners, and [D] efendants." Kemp v. 
Murray, 680 P.2d 758, 761 (Utah 1984). 
i[24 While GLFP claims that each of these entities are owned by 
members of the Clark and Learning families "such that adding them 
does not bring any new interests to the case," we disagree. Each 
of the above listed partnerships are separate business entities 
5. Although few courts have addressed the issue, it appears that 
the party seeking to rely upon the close corporation exception 
has the burden to come forward with evidence negating the three 
prongs identified in section 7.01(d) of ALI's Principles of 
Corporate Governance. See Brown v. Mailman, No. 95-2181-JWL, 
1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1153, at *10 (D. Kan. Jan. 19, 1996) 
("[E]ven if the close corporation exception were applied to this 
case, the plaintiffs have made no showing to satisfy the three 
threshold requirements . . . . ") . 
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with distinct legal rights and obligations. We cannot ignore the 
separate status of these entities merely because their owners are 
related. See NLRB v. Greater Kan. City Roofing, 2 F.3d 1047, 
1051 (10th Cir. 1993) ("Generally, a corporation is a legal 
entity, . . . and such a legal entity may not be disregarded 
. . . ." (quotations omitted)); see also 18 Am. Jur. 2d 
Corporations § 44 (2006) (noting that a corporation is "a 
distinct legal entity, with legal rights, obligations, powers and 
privileges different from those of the natural individuals who 
created it, own it, or whom it employs[ and i]n no legal sense 
can the business of a corporation be said to be that of its 
individual shareholders"). 
1(25 We therefore conclude that the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in failing to invoke the close corporation exception, 
even if such an exception is available in Utah to exempt GLFP 
from the requirements of the Utah Partnership Act. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 48-2a-1001. 
IV. Motion to Amend 
^26 GLFP's final argument is that it should be allowed to amend 
its complaint to either comply with the demand requirements set 
forth in Utah Code section 48-2a-1003 and rule 23.1 of the Rules 
of Civil Procedure or to allege facts supporting its assertion 
that such efforts would be futile. We will not disturb a trial 
courts ruling on a motion to amend absent a clear abuse of 
discretion. See Savage v. Utah Youth Village, 2004 UT 102,1J9, 
104 P. 3d 1242. The discretion granted a trial court to deny a 
motion to amend, however, must be tempered with the mandate of 
rule 15 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure that "leave [to 
amend] shall be freely given when justice so requires." Utah R. 
Civ. P. 15(a). 
[^2 7 In Aurora Credit Services, Inc. v. Liberty West Development 
Inc., 970 P.2d 1273 (Utah 1998), the Utah Supreme Court cited 
favorably the United States Supreme Court's caution that 
"'outright refusal to grant the leave [to amend] without any 
justifying reason appearing for the denial is not an exercise of 
discretion; it is merely abuse of that discretion and 
inconsistent with the spirit" of the rules of civil procedure. 
Id. at 1281 (quoting Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)). 
In the case before us, the trial court ruled that the motion to 
amend was "moot." Although neither of the parties were able to 
enlighten this court as to the rationale behind that conclusion, 
we think it likely that the trial court considered the motion in 
the context of its summary judgment disposing of all the claims 
asserted by GLFP. As discussed above, we hold that GLFP may 
proceed with its dissolution action and, if it proves it is 
entitled to dissolution, is also entitled to an accounting. 
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Therefore, the basis of the trial court's conclusion that the 
motion to amend is moot may no longer be valid. We therefore 
reverse the denial of the motion to amend with instructions for 
the trial court to reconsider it in the context of the remaining 
claims and the specific allegations of any draft amended 
complaint submitted by GLFP as required by rule 15. See Utah R. 
Civ. P. 15; see also Holmes Dev. L.L.C. v. Cook, 2002 UT 38,1(57, 
48 P. 3d 895 ("[A] motion for leave to amend must be accompanied 
by a memorandum of points and authorities in support and by a 
proposed amended complaint." (citation omitted)); see also 
Colores v. Sabey, 2003 UT App 339,1144, 79 P.3d 974.6 
1|28 "In deciding on a motion to amend, the trial court should 
primarily consider whether granting the motion would subject the 
opposing party to unavoidable prejudice 'by having -an issue 
adjudicated for which he had not had time to prepare.' " Aurora 
Credit, 970 P.2d at 1282 (quoting Bekins Bar V Ranch v. Huth, 664 
P.2d 455, 464 (Utah 1983)). In this case, Defendants brought 
their motion for summary judgment only five months after the 
complaint was filed and after limited discovery. Likewise, the 
claims asserted are the same and only the right to bring them 
directly is at issue. "The trial court must ultimately assess 
all of the factors on remand to determine if leave to amend is 
appropriate." Jd. 
1(2 9 Any proposed amended complaint filed by GLFP must either 
expressly allege that demand was made on the partnership or plead 
with particularity why such demand would be futile. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 48-2a-1003 (requiring a derivative action to "set 
forth with particularity the effort of the plaintiff to secure 
initiation of the action by a general partner or the reasons for 
not making the effort"). We note, however, that GLFP bears a 
significant burden if it seeks to proceed directly on the 
6. In Holmes Development L.L.C. v. Cookf 2002 UT 38, 48 P.3d 
895, the Utah Supreme Court interpreted rule 7.1(b)(1) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in conjunction with the Utah Rules 
of Judicial Administration to require that a motion to amend a 
complaint be accompanied by a proposed amended complaint. See 
id. at 1|57; see also Colores v. Sabey, 2003 UT App 339,^44, 79 
P.3d 974. Although rule 7(b)(1) was amended in 2 0 03, the same 
exact language relied upon by the Supreme Court in Holmes 
Development remains in current rule 7(b). Compare Utah R. Civ. 
P. 7(b)(1) (2002), with Utah R. Civ. P. 7(b) (2006). 
Accordingly, we continue to interpret rule 7 as requiring a 
plaintiff to attach a proposed amended complaint to a motion to 
amend. 
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derivative claims without first making demand on CL Properties.7 
To be exempted from the demand requirement, "the circumstances 
must be such that such a demand would be futile and unavailing." 
Dansie v. City of Herriman, 2006 UT 23,1)24, 13 P. 3d 1139 
(alteration and quotations omitted). Accordingly, the trial 
court "must examine first whether Plaintiffs did allege with 
particularity why demand would be futile and whether that 
allegation establishes that demand would have been futile and 
unavailing." Id. In doing so, the court "must exercise 
considerable caution before using futility to relieve a 
shareholder of his obligation to make the statutorily-required 
demand. " IcL. at 1(2 6. 
1)3 0 The Utah Supreme Court recognizes only two instances in 
which the futility exception will be met: (1) "demand would be 
futile if the corporation had specifically and explicitly stated 
that it would not pursue the claims brought in the derivative 
action [;]" and, (2) demand can be excused if making a demand 
would be "substantively detrimental" in that it could "permit [] 
the alleged perpetrator to cover up his misdeeds or to cause 
further harm to the corporation because he had been alerted that 
his unlawful conduct had been uncovered." Id. at K2 8. In 
evaluating any amended complaint based on the futility exception, 
the trial court should consider whether GLFP has alleged facts 
which support at least one of these narrow instances in which the 
exception may be applied. 
CONCLUSION 
K31 The trial court correctly determined that GLFP improperly 
asserted derivative claims directly when it alleged that 
Defendants breached their fiduciary duty, charged CL Properties 
excessive fees, commingled those fees to manage other properties, 
and mismanaged CL Properties's real estate holdings. Therefore 
summary judgment was proper on these claims. Because GLFP sought 
dissolution based on Defendant's alleged refusal to comply with 
the Revised Uniform Partnership Act--and not based solely on 
derivative theories of recovery--we reverse the trial court's 
order to the extent it entered summary judgment on that claim. 
We also hold that if GLFP proves that it is entitled to 
7. "[B]ecause this . . . issue is likely to be raised again upon 
remand, we . . . briefly address it here[.]" State v. Torres-
Garcia, 2006 UT App 45,^23 n.4, 131 P.3d 292; see also State v. 
Cloud, 722 P.2d 750, 755 (Utah 1986) (noting that it is 
appropriate, in the interest of judicial economy, to comment on 
"other contentions on appeal that will arise again upon 
retrial"). 
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dissolution, it may seek an accounting pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 48-1-40. Further, we affirm the trial court's refusal to 
invoke the close corporation exception and agree that GLFP should 
not be allowed, based on this exception, to bring derivative 
claims against Defendants directly. Finally, we reverse the 
trial court's denial of GLFP's motion to amend its complaint and 
remand for reconsideration of this issue in light of the 
remaining claims and allegations of GLFP's proposed amended 
complaint. We caution, however, that the futility exception to 
the demand requirement has been narrowly defined by the Utah 
Supreme Court. 
^32 Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
syna 
CarolyrVB. McHugh, Judg 
%33 I CONCUR: 
incrs. Judcre v M. Bill g , g
DAVIS, Judge (concurring in part and dissenting in part) : 
1|34 While leave to amend a complaint "shall be freely 
given when justice so requires," Utah R. Civ. P. 15(a), this 
court recognizes that "a motion for leave to amend must be 
accompanied by a memorandum of points and authorities in support 
and by a proposed amended complaint." Colores v. Sabey, 2003 UT 
App 339,1(43, 79 P.3d 974 (quotations and citation omitted); see 
also Holmes Dev., LLC v. Cook, 2002 UT 38,^59, 48 P.3d 895 
(holding that a trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
refusing to allow plaintiff to amend complaint when plaintiff 
failed to submit a proposed amended complaint with motion). 
Here, GLFP failed to submit a proposed amended complaint and 
instead merely promised that it would submit an amended complaint 
if the trial court granted its motion to amend. Respecting the 
exclusive derivative claims, GLFP failed to make demand on CL 
Properties prior to seeking leave to amend its complaint and 
failed to adequately allege or otherwise properly plead 
entitlement to the futility exception. In addition, the record 
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is unclear respecting whether the motion to amend had anything to 
do with the dissolution and accounting claims. Thus, in addition 
to ruling the motion moot, the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in refusing GLFP's motion to amend. See State v. 
Topanotes, 2003 UT 30,^9, 76 P.3d 1159 (holding that appellate 
courts "may affirm the judgment appealed from if it is 
sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the record" 
(quotations and citation omitted)). 
[^35 I see no justification in this case for departure from 
Colores and Holmes. Therefore, I dissent only from the 
majority's determination that the trial court erred by denying 
GLFP's motion for leave to amend its complaint, and I concur in 
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